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This paper considers vertical price relationships between wholesalers and retailers on five 
local maize markets in Benin. We show that if the common factor and the long-run 
disequilibrium error are not explicitly taken into account in testing the channel model, one 
can easily be wrong about how restrictions on the error-correction structure must be 
interpreted in terms of economic power in the channel. The empirical results show interesting 
differences between markets and reveal that retailers play a more prominent role in the price 
formation process than generally assumed in the literature. Retailers in the two major towns 
do not allow wholesalers to behave as vertical price leaders, but in the two larger rural 
centers, wholesalers involved in arbitrage among urban markets are able to influence price 
formation. 
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In the literature on industrial organization retail prices are often assumed to be determined 
by wholesale market conditions (see, for example, Tirole, 1988, Chapter 4; and Martin, 1993, 
Chapter 12). Likewise, in the marketing literature on the functioning of food markets in 
tropical countries, the vertical price leadership of wholesalers is often assumed. This is often 
based on popular complaints from retailers and market organizations. Looking at the Benin 
maize market, Lutz (1994) found that retail and wholesale price series in the same market 
place cohere, which implies that retail margins are stationary. This result suggests that 
retailers are indeed passive decision makers, following wholesale prices without taking local 
supply and demand conditions into account. On the contrary, a survey among traders showed 
that a large number of wholesalers from different surplus regions supply the urban market and 
that the buying strategy of most retailers is to buy from the wholesaler who proposes the 
lowest price (Lutz, 1994). Moreover, in rural areas retailers can choose to buy either from 
wholesalers or at the farm gate. Buying directly from farmers may provide retailers some 
freedom to set prices. Consequently, it is not a settled matter whether wholesalers or retailers 
or both have some market power and are able to influence price formation.   2
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In an earlier study on price arbitrage in the wholesale segment of the maize market, we 
concluded that all wholesale markets played a role in the price formation process (Kuiper et 
al., 1999). None of the price series of any of the wholesale markets were found to be 
dominant: all price series were interdependent. The arbitrage process corresponded to a 
network with a number of interdependent wholesale markets; there were no autarkic markets 
and transportation costs did not show a stochastic trend. The study, however, did not 
incorporate the price series observed on the retail segments. In the present paper we focus on 
this omission, questioning the relationship between prices on wholesale and retail market 
segments in various markets for the same sample period as in Kuiper et al. (1999). The 
questions we set out to answer are: is there a difference in wholesale-retail price relationships 
in towns and rural centers, and is there any evidence for wholesale market dominance vis-à-
vis the retailers? 
Most studies on vertical price relationships published to date in marketing and industrial 
organization (see, for example, Gerstner and Hess, 1991; Lee and Staelin, 1997 and the 
references they cite) have used comparative statics to study channel behavior; the long-run 
relationships derived have not been empirically tested. Our study differs in that its main focus 
is empirical analysis. In order to verify whether the price formation process is driven by 
retailers, wholesalers, or both, we can distinguish two segments in the market: the retail 
segment and the wholesale segment. We assume that actors in both segments try to maximize 
profits. To examine whether or not wholesalers are price leader vis-à-vis the retailers in the 
sense of Stackelberg leadership, one can consider the long-run equilibrium (i.e., 
cointegrating) relationship between the wholesale and retail prices and test whether or not 
wholesale prices and retail prices respond to deviations from the equilibrium price.  
The basic assumption we make is that the common stochastic factor observed in the 
cointegrated wholesale-retail price series is generated by local supply and demand conditions 
(seasonal price trend). Three models then become interesting for the study of price 
adjustment: Model 1 in which both retailers and wholesalers have some freedom to respond to 
deviations from the equilibrium price, Model 2 in which only retailers have the power to 
respond to deviations from the equilibrium price; and Model 3 in which only wholesalers 
have the freedom to respond to deviations from the equilibrium price.  
In Model 1 wholesalers have sufficient power vis-à-vis the retailers to behave as vertical 
price leaders, although retailers can still maximize their profits conditional on the wholesale 
price being set by the wholesalers. This model applies if both retail and wholesale traders 
exercise some market power; for example, if alternative market opportunities exist for both 
actors. In contrast, in Model 2 the retailers do not allow wholesalers to influence short-run 
retail price deviations and leave them with only the option of setting wholesale prices on the 
basis of the wholesalers’ unit costs (i.e., farm gate price plus a margin to enable the 
wholesaler to survive), which represents the common factor that drives the two prices, the 
retail price and the wholesale price, in the long run. Market power for retailers may be the 
result of a temporarily abundant supply in the wholesale segment and a lack of alternative 
market opportunities for wholesalers. Lastly, in Model 3, only wholesalers are able to set their 
prices in the sense of Stackelberg leadership and to respond to price deviations from the 
equilibrium. The situation applying in this model is one in which large numbers of retailers 
buy from farmers and wholesalers to serve local consumers, whereas the local wholesalers are 
also involved in regional market arbitrage and ship to urban markets. Consequently, the retail 
price is getting stuck to the common factor from which the wholesale price can deviate in the 
short run by price arbitrage among the spatially dispersed wholesale markets.    3
In deriving the testable implications of the hypotheses about economic power in marketing 
channels, we explicitly take the common factor and the deviations from the long-run vertical 
price equilibrium into account This is the major contribution of our paper to the debate on 
vertical price leadership and we will show that if the common factor and disequilibrium error 
are not explicitly assigned to certain variables in the channel model, one can easily be wrong 
about how restrictions on the error-correction model must be interpreted in terms of vertical 
price leadership. Furthermore, since we wish to test between the three theoretical models 
outlined above, another important advantage of our empirical method is that it nests these 
tests in one procedure. 
The article analyzes the process of price formation for maize in five market places in the 
south of Benin: two towns (Bohicon and Cotonou) and three rural centers (Azové, Kétou and 
Dassa). Section 2 will discuss the relevance of the three above-mentioned models. In Section 
3 the method of analysis is presented. We formulate the long-run model and derive its testable 
implications on the short-run price system. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Relevance of the distinguished market models 
 
The market for maize, the staple food crop in the south of Benin, consists of a number of 
market places, scattered throughout the region. Most transactions take place in spot markets; 
buyers and sellers meet in the market place where the maize for sale is displayed on the 
market day. Maize is transferred from producers to final consumers through conventional 
marketing channels, where more or less homogenous products are traded between actors who 
are not involved in recurrent trade relationships. In each market place a retail and a wholesale 
segment can be distinguished. In the large towns, local retailers generally buy on the 
wholesale segment of the market, while retailers in rural centers can choose to obtain their 
stocks either from the wholesale segment or directly at the farm gate.  
Cotonou (Dantokpa) and Bohicon are two important urban markets in the country. Both 
market places are a centre for retail trade. As urban price levels are relatively high, supply on 
the local wholesale segment is directed to serve only local retail demand. Sometimes 
wholesalers organize themselves in order to address specific problems. However, because of 
the large number of wholesalers and brokers active in the market, there are no enforcement 
mechanisms to control entry or prices. Moreover, the wholesalers originate from all regions in 
the country which means that they have no real common interest. Consequently, entry into the 
wholesale market-segment is free (Lutz, 1994). On the other hand, for retailers entry is 
constrained by a lack of space on the market: most retailers have a permanent place. Retailers 
try to tie clients by selling on credit and by negotiating the amounts per unit of measurement. 
Apparently, retailers have some freedom to deviate from equilibrium prices. Based on the 
literature we were inclined to expect Model 3 to simulate wholesaler-retailer relationships. 
However, based on our observation that a large number of wholesalers supply the wholesale 
market segment in the towns and that there is some room for monopolistic competition among 
the retailers, we argue that also Model 2 can hold for both Cotonou and Bohicon. 
Important surpluses of maize are traded from Azové and Dassa to the two towns. 
Consequently, the wholesalers in these rural markets are involved in regional market 
arbitrage, and hence anticipate supply and demand conditions in the different, but spatially 
price-integrated, wholesale markets. On both markets a large number of retailers are found. 
They buy directly from farmers that supply early in the morning a part of their surplus on the 
wholesale segment (they need money to finance that days’ purchases on the market), or buy 
from local wholesalers. From these observations our empirical results with respect to Azové   4
and Dassa are expected to be in line with the assumptions made in the literature and to 
comply with Model 3. 
Kétou is considered to be a rural market place, trading large maize surpluses. On the 
wholesale market segment a relatively large number of local wholesalers sell to non-resident 
urban wholesalers, in particular from Cotonou. Wholesalers in Kétou do not have a local 
alternative for the demand from Cotonou, because there are very few retailers in Kétou 
(approximately five per market day), who mainly buy at the farm gate. The local retail market 
is thin as most residents buy directly from farmers or are farmers themselves. However, some 
local consumers depend on the market in Kétou. This implies that the small number of 
retailers may exercise some monopolistic behavior. Therefore, Model 2 can be expected to be 





3.1. Theoretical  framework 
 
Let us consider a two-stage channel with M (M ≥ 1) wholesalers upstream and N (N ≥ 1) 
retailers downstream (M ≤ N). We model the long-run supply decision behavior of these 
channel members. During the period covered by one time series observation t (e.g., a day in 
case of daily observations), each wholesaler j (j = 1, … , M) exclusively supplies Mj retailers 
(Mj ≥ 1 ∧  N = ∑ =
M
j j M
1 ). The retailer buys an amount of qi (i = 1, … , N) of an intermediate 
good from the wholesaler at a wholesale price pwi. The wholesaler acquired the intermediate 
good at a constant unit cost pf i (the weighted average of the farm gate price faced by the 
wholesaler with respect to qi) and distributed it at a constant unit cost cwi, Retailer i faces 
constant unit retailing cost, cri, and resells the product to the consumers at a price pri on the 
retail market. It is assumed that the wholesalers and retailers do not throw away any of the 
intermediate good. Consequently, the quantity bought by the wholesalers is equal to the 
quantity finally consumed. 
Let the consumer behavior faced by retailer i be given by the following flexible demand 
function (see, e.g., Lilien and Kotler, 1983, p. 74):  
 
pri  =  i i i x q s +
δ ,                      (1) 
 
where qi is the quantity sold by retailer i and si and xi capture exogenous shifts in the demand 
curve and may also contain a constant term. 
We first consider the Stackelberg model in which the wholesalers are the vertical price 
leaders, i.e., each retailer i maximizes profit conditional on the wholesale price that has to be 
paid to the wholesaler, and the wholesaler then determines qi or, similarly, pwi, by maximizing 
profit while taking the conditional profit-maximizing behavior of retailer i into account. The 
conditional profit-maximization problem of retailer i can be written as: 
 
 max  (pri − cri − pwi)qi  ,            
    (2a) 
     qi 
 
or equivalently, 
   5
 max  (pri − cri − pwi)qi                       (2b) 
     pri 
 
subject to (1). The first-order condition for this problem is: 




   qi + (dqi/dpri)(pri − cri − pwi) = 0 .                     (3b) 
 
From each of both (3a) and (3b) it follows that: 
 
 p wi = (1 + δ)pri − cri − αxi                        (4) 
 
Wholesaler  j maximizes individual profit while taking the conditional profit-maximizing 
behavior of the retailers into account, so that 
 
  ∑ =
j M
k 1 max (pwk − cwk − pfk)qk  ,             ( 5 a )  




  ∑ =
j M
k 1 max (pwk − cwk − pfk)qk             ( 5 b )  
    pwk 
 
is subjected to (4) and has the following Mj first-order conditions: 
 




 q k + (dqk/dpwk)(pwk − cwk − pfk) = 0            (6b) 
 
with k = 1, ... , Mj. Using (4), from each of both (6a) and (6b) we can derive Mj linear 
combinations of the wholesale and retail prices without qk included: 
 
  pwk + δ(1 + δ)prk = cwk + pfk  + δ(1 + δ)xk               ( 7 )  
 
Recall that N = ∑ =
M
j j M
1 . Consequently, the total number of relations given by (7) equals N. 
If we express the price relationships (4) and (7) in weighted average market prices, we 
obtain: 
 
  pw = (1 + δ)pr − cr − δx ,             ( 8 a )  
 
  pw + δ(1 + δ)pr = cw + pf  + δ(1 + δ)x ,       
    (8b) 
   6
where 
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which shows that it is important to collect the data for each retail account instead of taking the 
wholesaler as an account, because if we define 
 




k k wk wj q q p p
1 1 /  and  ∑ = ≡
j M
k k wj q q




j wj wj q q p
1 1 / ≠ pw . 
 
Solving (8a) and (8b) for pr and pw gives: 
 
  pr = (1 + δ)
−2{cr + cw + pf + [(1 + δ)
2 − 1]x}                (9a) 
 
  pw = (1 + δ)
−1{cw + pf − δcr + δx}.                 (9b) 
 
In this study it is interesting to observe that if prices are set according to (9a) and (9b), then 
the wholesalers have enough power vis-à-vis the retailers to behave as vertical price leaders in 
choosing pw. However, if the retailers dominate, then we may have a situation in which each 
retailer maximizes profit and forces the wholesaler to set prices on the basis of total unit costs 
alone, leading to the following expression in weighted averages: 
 
 p w = cw + pf .                    (10) 
 
So far, two models have been considered: the model made up by (9a) and (9b), Model 1, 
according to which the wholesaler is able to manipulate the retail price by dpwk/dqk in (6a) (or, 
similarly, by dqk/dpw in (6b)), and the model formed by the weighted average of (4): 
 
 p w = (1 + δ)pr − cr − αx                      (11) 
 
and (10), Model 2, which says that the retailers dominate. In addition, a third model, Model 3, 
is obtained if we assume that the retailer is able to buy directly from the farmer and set pr on 
the basis on pf as follows: 
 
 p r = cw + pf                    ( 1 2 )  
 
where  cw  is added  to cover the costs that would otherwise be made by the wholesaler. 
Competition among retailers tends to be pure and as a consequence, a retailer is not able to 
charge a price that is different from the one determined by (12). Nevertheless, in spite of the 
retailer’s ability to buy directly from the farmer, the retailer can also buy from the wholesaler 
while having pr still determined by (12). Although the wholesaler is not able to influence the 
local retail market because pr is fixed by (12), the wholesaler can still determine pw by (9b) if 
involved in market arbitrage, so that pw can be based on the reaction function of retailers in 
other local markets that are unable to buy directly from the farmer. The testable implications 
of the three models being considered will be discussed in the next subsection. 
   7
 
3.2. Econometric  considerations 
 
Many economic time series, like prt and pwt (t = 0, 1, ... ,T), do not fluctuate around a 
constant in a seemingly random way, but their first differences, ∆prt = prt − pr,t−1 and ∆pwt = 
pwt − pw,t−1, do (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Granger and Newbold, 1986). Consequently, the 
variables in levels, prt and pwt, are assumed to be nonstationary by containing a unit root, 
while in first differences they will be stationary. In time series analysis this is expressed by 
saying that prt and pwt are integrated of order one, denoted prt ~ I(1) and pwt ~ I(1), and ∆prt 
and ∆pwt are integrated of order zero, denoted ∆prt ~ I(0) and ∆pwt ~ I(0). 
The nonstationarity in case of a unit root is caused by a so-called ‘stochastic trend’ 
(Banerjee et al., 1993, p. 153), which can be interpreted as the driving force of the variable. If 
two variables are driven by the same stochastic trend, then a linear combination of the two 
will be stationary, which is expressed by saying that the two variables are ‘cointegrated’ 
(Engle and Granger, 1987) or, equivalently, have a ‘common stochastic trend’ (Stock and 
Watson, 1988). 
At first sight, there appear to be three variables by which a stochastic trend could enter the 
price system derived from (1): xt, crt, and cwt + pft. For now we simply assume that xt and crt do 
not contain a stochastic trend of importance when compared with the stochastic trend 
generated by the prices of the raw product as represented by the farm gate price pft. 
Consequently, we assume that cwt + pft introduces the stochastic trend in the price system, 
expressing local supply and demand conditions and seasonal factors. In the empirical analysis 
the stationarity assumption of xt and crt is tested by the concept of cointegration. 
To illustrate the relationship between the concept of a stochastic trend and the concept of 
cointegration, let us consider the retail price prt and the wholesale price pwt in a vector 
autoregression of order k, denoted VAR(k), as follows: 
 






Γj∆X t−j + ΦDt + εt           (13) 
 
where Xt = [prt, pwt]′ ~ I(1), ∆Xt = Xt − Xt−1, the Π and Γj (j = 1, ... ,k−1) are (2×2) parameter 
matrices, Φ is a (2×m) parameter matrix, Dt is an (m×1) vector with deterministic elements, εt 
= [εrt, εwt]′ are disturbances that follow a two-dimensional Gaussian white noise process, and 
the values of  X-k+1, ... , X0 are fixed. Notice that there can never be a relationship between a 
variable with a stochastic trend and a variable without a stochastic trend. So, if ∆Xt ~ I(0) 
since Xt ~ I(1) (and hence, Xt−1 ~ I(1)), then Π will be a zero matrix except when a linear 
combination of the variables in Xt is stationary, i.e., when prt and pwt are cointegrated (or 
when one of the prices is stationary so that we should also test for the absence of each 
individual price in the cointegrating relation to justify our assumption that both prices are 
I(1)). Because this linear combination is unique, the rank of Π will be equal to one, i.e., 
rank(Π) = 1. Hence, rank(Π) = 0 if there is no cointegration and rank(Π) = 2 if Xt ~ I(0). The 
Johansen procedure (for example, Johansen and Juselius, 1990; and Johansen, 1995) 
estimates the parameters in (13); to test for cointegration, trace statistics are used to determine 
the rank of Π, and asymptotic t statistics are used to test for the absence of each individual 
price in the long-run equilibrium, in order to check whether both price series are I(1). 
Clearly, the result of interest will be rank(Π) = 1. In this case Π can be decomposed into Π 
= αβ′, where α = [αr, αw]′ is the adjustment vector and β = [βr, βw]′ is the cointegrating 
vector, so that (13) becomes a vector error-correction model (VECM): 
   8






Γj∆Xt−j + ΦDt + εt           (14) 
 
where  β′Xt  ~  I(0) and represents the deviations from the long-run equilibrium, that is, 
cointegrating, relationship between prt and pwt, and the changes in at least one of the prices, 
∆Xt, respond to these deviations from the previous period, β′Xt−1, through the adjustment 
parameters α in such a way that the disequilibrium errors β′Xt, β′Xt+1, ... converge to zero. 
Premultiplying (14) by β′ and rearranging, gives: 
 






β′Γj∆Xt−j + β′ΦDt + β′εt .         (15) 
 
Because ∆Xt−j (j = 1,...,k − 1) and εt are stationary, the condition |1 + β′α| < 1, or equivalently, 
−2 < β′α < 0, allows β′Xt to be stationary as well. If we return to our theoretical framework in 
the previous subsection, then given the assumption that xt and crt are stationary, (11) is the 
linear combination of prt and pwt in Model 1 that represents β′Xt: crt  + δxt = (1 + δ)prt − pwt = 
β′Xt. In Model 2 the cointegrating relationship is the same one as in Model 1, but now pwt is 
given by (10) instead of (9b). Lastly, in Model 3, substituting (12) for cwt + pft in (9b) yields 
the following long-run relationship between prt and pwt: δ(xt −  crt) = prt − (1 + δ)pwt. Notice 
that each time the disequilibrium error consists of a linear combination of crt and xt. Hence, 
testing for cointegration can be seen as a check of our assumption that crt and xt are stationary. 
The long-run equilibrium implies a common stochastic trend in the prices prt and pwt. To 
study the econometric implications of this trend, let α⊥ = [αr⊥, αw⊥]′ be a (2×1) vector of 
parameters of full rank such that α′α⊥ = 0. Premultiplying (14) by α⊥′ shows that α⊥′∆Xt does 
not respond to the disequilibrium errors, while its solution, α⊥′Xt, is driven by the stochastic 
trend, α⊥′ ε i i
t
= ∑ 0 . Further define β⊥ = [βr⊥, βw⊥]′ as a (2×1) vector of full rank such that β′β⊥ 
= 0. Using the relation β⊥(α⊥′β⊥)
−1α⊥′ + α(β′α)
−1β′ = I it can be seen that: 
 
  Xt = β⊥(α⊥′β⊥)
−1α⊥′Xt + α(β′α)
−1β′Xt .           (16) 
 
Because  β does not contain zero elements, neither does β⊥. Moreover, α⊥′β⊥ is a scalar 
unequal to zero. Consequently, the stochastic trend introduced by α⊥′Xt is the common 
stochastic trend in the prices prt and pwt. This is why Gonzalo and Granger (1995) define 
α⊥′Xt as the common factor. Note that if αr⊥ = 0 (αw⊥ = 0), then αw = 0 (αr = 0). The 
implication is that pwt ( prt) captures the common factor, whereas prt  (pwt) does all the 
correction to eliminate any deviation from long-run equilibrium, see also (16). In turn, this is 
equivalent to saying that there is long-run causality running from pwt to prt (prt to pwt). See 
Hall and Milne (1994), Granger and Lin (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) for the 
concept of long-run causality and see, for example, Tiffin and Dawson (1996) and Dawson 
and Tiffin (1998) for empirical applications. 
Using the econometric concepts introduced above, we can now derive the testable 
implications that discriminate between our three strategic channel pricing models: Model 1, 
given by (9a) and (9b) and implying price leadership of the wholesaler; Model 2, formed by 
(9a) and (10) and implying that the retailer dominates since the wholesaler is only allowed to 
set its price on the basis of the farm gate price; and Model 3, composed of (9b) and (12) to 
capture the fact that the retailer buys directly from the farmer while the wholesaler is involved 
in market arbitrage. Given that cwt  +  pft  introduces the stochastic trend, while a linear 
combination of the stationary variables crt and xt represents the disequilibrium error, it follows   9
that in Model 1 the common factor is captured by a linear combination of both prices, prt and 
pwt, see (8b). Consequently, both prt and pwt will display error correction. In Model 2 pwt is not 
error correcting, see (10), but prt is: (11) includes crt and xt. Lastly, in Model 3, prt does not 
show error-correcting behavior, see (12), but pwt does, see (9b).  
Notice that these results are counter-intuitive when compared with the literature on spatial 
(i.e., horizontal) price integration, where it is the price of the reference (i.e., dominant) market 
that should not show error-correcting behavior (for example, Silvapulle and Jayasuriya, 1994; 
or Dercon, 1995). On the contrary, in our first two channel (i.e., vertical) pricing models, 
Model 1 and Model 2, the price of the leader does respond to the error-correction term. This 
shows that it is important to assign the common stochastic trend and the disequilibrium errors 
to the respective variables in the theoretical model (in our framework the stochastic trend is 
generated by cwt + pft and the disequilibrium errors are introduced by a linear combination of 




4. Empirical analysis 
 
All five markets are periodic and are held in a four-day cycle. Daily wholesale and retail 
prices are available for all five markets: for 190 market days at Cotonou (4 September 1987 to 
29 September 1989), 160 market days at Bohicon (1 January 1988 to 29 September 1989), 
184 market days at Azové (28 September 1987 to 29 September 1989), 174 market days at 
Dassa (3 November 1987 to 25 September 1989) and, lastly, 144 market days at Kétou (3 
March 1988 to 25 September 1989). For each market the time series of the retail prices and 
wholesale prices are displayed in one figure, see Figure 1 (data available from authors on 
request). See Lutz (1994) or Lutz et al. (1995) for a description of the elaborate method used 
to collect these market prices. Annual inflation was only 2 to 3 per cent during the sample 
period and can be ignored when compared to the stochastic trend fluctuations in the prices. 
Hence, the price series were not deflated. 
Figure 1 nicely shows the coherence between the wholesale and retail prices. Moreover, 
the considerable price fall in 1988 clearly marks the end of the lean season after the relatively 
bad harvest in 1987, and the start of a new promising harvest. Nevertheless, in spite of this 
large price shock, the estimated breakpoint test statistic of Zivot and Andrews (1992) does not 
reject I(1) against the alternative of single structural breakpoint stationarity, see Table 1, 
although the test statistic for the wholesale price series of Bohicon is just a bit smaller than 
the 5% critical value. 
For each market we considered the retail and wholesale prices and estimated bivariate 
VARs of order k = 1,..., 11. All computations were performed in EViews, Version 3.1. To 
determine the appropriate order, the commonly used Akaike criterion (AIC) was computed 
(see, for example, Lütkepohl, 1991). The estimate for k, denoted k*, was chosen so that AIC 
was minimized. The results are presented in Table 2 and show that all k* are much smaller 
than the maximum lag length fixed at 11, suggesting that it is unnecessary to conclude that it 
is more fruitful to increase the information set by adding new variables (and hence, equations) 
to the VAR rather than to automatically increase the lag length. 
Next, we applied the Johansen procedure (Johansen, 1992) to jointly test for cointegration 
and deterministic components, see also Harris (1995, p. 97). We found the wholesale price 
and the retail price to be cointegrated for each market; this supports our assumption that the 
unit retailing cost ct and the exogenous demand shifts captured by xt can be considered to be 
stationary. The results are presented in Table 3 and are based on (13) and (14). It appears that   10
none of the selected models contain deterministic terms. Comparing the trace statistics with 
their critical values shows that for each market r = 0 (i.e., no cointegration) must be rejected 
(which was true for all models for the deterministic components) while r  ≤ 1 (i.e., 
cointegration) cannot be rejected. In contrast to the widely used Engle-Granger two-step 








































Figure 1  Prices in Fcfa per kilogram per day. Period between each daily observation is 
three days (markets are held in a four-day cycle). Observation 1 represents date 9/4/87; 
observation 20 is date 11/19/87; observation 40 is date 2/7/88; observation 60 is date 4/27/88; 
observation 80 is date 7/16/88; observation 100 is date 10/4/88; observation 120 is date 
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date 8/20/89. PRC: retail price Cotonou; PWC: wholesale price Cotonou; PRB: retail price 
Bohicon; PWB: wholesale price Bohicon; PRA: retail price Azové; PWA: wholesale price 
Azové; PRD: retail price Dassa; PWD: wholesale price Dassa; PRK: retail price Kétou; PWK: 
wholesale price Kétou. 
 
Table 1   Minimum  t values for Model (A) with k = 8 obtained by applying the 
procedure of Zivot and Andrews (1992) to test for I(1) against the alternative of single 
structural breakpoint I(0). 
 
Series       minimum  t value    date  of 
           breakpoint 
 
retail  price  Cotonou      −3.42     6/30/88 
wholesale price Cotonou        −3.69     6/30/88 
retail  price  Bohicon      −3.96     7/04/88 
wholesale price Bohicon        −4.83*     6/26/88 
retail  price  Azové      −3.97     6/22/88 
wholesale price Azové        −4.17     6/30/88 
retail  price  Dassa      −4.30     7/12/88 
wholesale price Dassa        −4.07     7/12/88 
retail  price  Kétou      −4.24     6/30/88 
wholesale price Kétou        −4.04     6/30/88 
 
* and ** indicate that the I(1) hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Critical t values are 
−4.80 (0.05 level) and −5.34 (0.01 level), see Zivot and Andrews (1992, Table 2). 
 
ant to the choice of the variable selected for normalization (Hamilton, 1994). In our 
presentation we chose the retail price to be the left-hand variable of the cointegrating 
relationship (ert is the disequilibrium error, see Table 3). For each market place we found the 
parameter of the wholesale price to be highly significant (using asymptotic t values). If we 
took the wholesale price as the left-hand variable and estimated the parameter of the retail 
price, we found all parameters to be significant as well. Consequently, both prices must be 
I(1) and their relationship is a real cointegrating relationship, complying with our assumption 
that xt and crt are stationary. 
 
Table 2   Order determination of bivariate VARs consisting of the retail price series and 
the wholesale price series of the corresponding market. 
 
Market                AIC at k =  
   
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11 
   
Cotonou  11.63 11.59*  11.60 11.62 11.59 11.62 11.64 11.67 11.71 11.75 11.77 
Bohicon  10.08 10.08 10.04*  10.09 10.14 10.15 10.17 10.20 10.22 10.28 10.32 
Azové    11.48 11.48 11.46 11.45*  11.46 11.50 11.52 11.51 11.53 11.55 11.58 
Dassa   11.96 11.93 11.92*  11.96 11.97 11.99 12.02 12.01 12.02 12.05 12.04 
Kétou   12.51 12.50 12.48 12.48 12.42*  12.48 12.52 12.56 12.61 12.58 12.57 
 
* indicates lowest value. AIC is Akaike information criterion. Maximum lag length of each VAR is set at 11.   12
 
From the cointegrating relationships in Table 3 we can also deduce that the parameter of 
the wholesale price is significantly greater than one in all markets except Kétou. In Kétou the 
parameter can be restricted to one, confirming our observation that most consumers in Kétou 
buy directly from the farmers or are farmers themselves. In the other markets, retailers’ long-
run margin behavior is characterized by charging a percentage mark-up (cf. Von Ungern-
Sternberg, 1994). 
 
Table  3  Testing for cointegration among the retail price series and wholesale price 
series of the corresponding market. 
 
Market      Critical Values
      Cointegrating Relationship 
  Intercept  r ≤  Trace      5%     1%      (standard error in parentheses) 
   
Cotonou  absent in   0  30.31   12.32   16.36      prt = 1.11 pwt + ert 
    VECM    1    0.20     4.13     6.94             (0.01) 
 
Bohicon  absent in   0  24.69   12.32   16.36      prt = 1.07 pwt + ert 
    VECM    1    0.58     4.13     6.94             (0.01) 
 
Azové   absent in   0  29.45   12.32   16.36      prt = 1.09 pwt + ert 
    VECM    1    0.61     4.13     6.94             (0.01) 
 
Dassa    absent in   0  22.43   12.32   16.36      prt = 1.17 pwt + ert 
    VECM    1    0.85     4.13     6.94             (0.02) 
 
Kétou    absent in   0  13.74   12.32   16.36      prt = 1.039 pwt + ert 
    VECM    1    1.03     4.13     6.94             (0.022) 
 
The critical values are obtained from MacKinnon et al. (1999, Case I, k = 0), see also Osterwald-Lenum (1992, 
Table 0). ert is the residual of the cointegrating relationship. 
 
Based on the long-run parameter estimates presented in Table 3, we estimated the short-
run parameters α and Γj (this time, including an intercept). The α parameters, which can be 
interpreted as adjustment parameters, are of particular interest, because they were used to test 
our models. The estimates of the adjustment parameters are presented in Table 4 and appear 
to be in favor of our hypotheses, in particular if one compares the t values with the Dickey-
Fuller critical values (cf. Schotman, 1989) which, in absolute terms, are larger than the critical 
values of the standard t distribution so that, by way of approximation, we applied a one-sided 
t test at the 0.01 level instead of the 0.05 one. Model 2, implying that retailers dominate the 
wholesalers and are able to exercise some monopolistic behavior, applies to Cotonou, 
Bohicon and Kétou, because prt is error correcting (αr is significant and lies within −2 and 0) 
and pwt is not (αw is insignificant). The results for Azové and Dassa according to which pwt is 
error correcting (αw is significant and lies within 0 and 2) and prt is not (αr is insignificant), 
comply with Model 3, indicating that there is a direct link between the retail price and the 
farm gate price, while the wholesalers are able to be involved in market arbitrage, leaving 
them some leeway to influence wholesale prices. 
 
   13
5. Conclusions 
 
Recall that we proposed a method for empirically testing whether or not wholesalers have 
some price setting power vis-à-vis the retailers. The method was applied to three models that 
were considered as possible candidates for describing the vertical price relationships in the 
marketing channels of local maize markets in Benin. A salient feature of our method is that 
the common stochastic trend and the deviations from the long-run vertical price equilibrium 
must be assigned to the variables in each model being considered. Doing this for the 
application in this paper, we found that the exclusion restrictions on the error-correction 
structure led to testable implications discriminating between the three models. 
 
Table 4  Testing for long-run causality between the retail price series and the wholesale 
price series of the corresponding market. 
 
Market      Effective   Estimate    Estimate 
    sample size         αr    t value        αw    t value 
   
Cotonou       188      −0.30*  −4.85         0.09     1.69 
Bohicon       157      −0.33*  −4.90       −0.07   −0.82 
Azové        180      −0.16   −1.29        0.39*    3.04 
Dassa         164        0.20      1.96        0.34*    4.26   
Kétou         134      −0.37*  −2.77        0.07     0.88 
 
* indicates significantly different from zero (one-sided test at the 0.01 level). αr is the coefficient of er, t−1, that is, 
the error correction term (see Table 3), in the equation for ∆prt and αw is the coefficient of er, t−1 in the equation 
for ∆pwt. 
 
As far as our limited evidence goes, we conclude that retailers do not allow wholesalers to 
behave as vertical price leaders in the sense of Stackelberg leadership, unless the wholesalers 
are involved in market arbitrage. In fact, in the towns wholesalers do not have alternative 
market opportunities and retailers dominate the local market price formation process. In 
Kétou, the few retailers that exist seem to be able to exploit some opportunities for 
monopolistic competition. In Dassa and Azové wholesalers dominate: retail prices are stuck 
to the stochastic trend, while wholesalers have alternative arbitrage opportunities, giving them 
some freedom to influence prices. 
Our empirical results indicate that relations between wholesalers and retailers vary 
between market places. In contrast to common assumption, retailers play a crucial role in the 
price formation process. Local market conditions are decisive for the distribution of market 
power among retailers and wholesalers. Consequently, the statement that ‘the retail market 
segment is dominated by the wholesale segment’ needs to be tested before it is imposed as an 
assumption on a model. 
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